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ESSAYS
SYMPOSIUM: MATERIAL SUPPORT AND THE
WAR ON TERROR
MATERIAL SUPPORT: IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONAL SECURITY
Bryan Clark+ & William Holahan*
On January 29, 2010, the Catholic University Law Review held its annual
symposium. This year, the Symposium, titled "Immigration and National
Security: Material Support and the War on Terror," focused on the so-called
"material-support bar" found in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (I.N.A), which prohibits the admission of any alien who has
provided "material support" to a "terrorist organization" or for "the
commission of a terrorist activity" to the United States.' The material-support
bar is the product of four statutory enactments, 2 the three most recent of which
were responses to specific acts of terrorism passed to prevent future terrorist
attacks on the United States. Congress's aim to enhance U.S. national security
was noble, but the gradual expansion of the material-support bar has
dramatically reduced the number of meritorious refugees and asylum seekers
who can resettle in the United States. In some cases, the refugees and asylum
seekers denied entry into the United States under the material-support bar are
themselves victims of terrorism and are barred because they gave "material
support" to a "terrorist organization" after being threatened with torture and
death. Others have been barred for their roles in challenging oppressive
regimes in their home countries, even though many acted with the support of
the U.S. government. The material-support bar also extends to hundreds of
+ J.D., 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S., 2004, Trinity
University. Production Editor for Volume 59 of the Catholic University Law Review.
. J.D., 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2006, Trinity
College. Lead Articles Editor for Volume 59 of the Catholic University Law Review.
I. Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006); I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (providing
that "[a]ny alien who ... has engaged in a terrorist activity ... is inadmissible to the United
States"); see also infra note 11.
2. See Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA
PATRIOT Act) of 2001, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3); REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
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refugees who have resettled in the United States, each of whom is waiting for
his status to be adjusted to Lawful Permanent Resident, as well as hundreds of
affirmative asylum seekers who petition for asylum after arriving in the United
States.
The Catholic University Law Review's Symposium addressed the tension
between national security and the government's "deep and abiding"
"commitment ... to protecting and assisting refugees" that "is a part of our
nation's history and . . . goes to our very core values." 3 The Symposium
included a panel discussion among material-support experts Anwen Hughes,
Jedidah Hussey, and Stephen Schulman, and it was moderated by Professor
Carlos Ortiz-Miranda. The following is a summary of the complex issues
related to the material-support bar. This summary discusses the issue's
legislative history; dissects the material-support bar provisions; applies the
material-support bar to refugees and asylum seekers; and examines executive
action, case law, and proposals for reform.
I. MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The material-support bar arises from the confluence of four related statutory
provisions. First, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) and 1227(a)(4)(B)(i) provide
for the exclusion and deportation of aliens who have engaged, or are likely to
engage, in "terrorist activity.' 4 Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) defines
3. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2009: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, at ii (2008) (quoting then-Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. I.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), id. § 1227(a)(4)(B). Section
I182(a)(3)(B)(i) provides the general grounds for inadmissibility resulting from an alien's
involvement in terrorist activities:
Any alien who-
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity;
(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland
Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to
engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iv));
(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious
bodily harm, incited terrorist activity;
(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of-
(aa) a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or
(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or espouses terrorist
activity;
' (V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of
clause (vi);
(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), unless
the alien can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization;
(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or
espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization;
[Vol. 59:935
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"terrorist activity." 5 Third, 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iv) defines "engag[ing] in
terrorist activity," in part, as "afford[ing] material support . . . for the
commission of a terrorist activity[] ... to any individual who the actor knows,
or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist
activity; [or] . . . to a terrorist organization., 6  Fourth, 8 U.S.C. §
(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in section 2339D(c)(1) of
title 18) from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was
received, was a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or
(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this
subparagraph, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within
the last 5 years, is inadmissible.
An alien who is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization is considered, for purposes of this chapter, to be engaged in a terrorist activity.
I.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).
Section 1227(a)(4)(B) simply adopts the inadmissibility provisions in § 1182: "Any alien who
is described in subparagraph (B) or (F) of section 1182(a)(3) of this title is deportable." Id. §
1227(a)(4)(B).
5. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(iii). "Terrorist activity" is
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which,
if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:
(1) The highijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or
vehicle).
(I) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another
individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or
abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
individual seized or detained.
(Ill) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section
11 16(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or
more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii).
6. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(3)(B)(iv). In full, "engage in terrorist
activity" means the power of an "individual" or a "member of an organization"
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause
death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(l) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization;
2010]
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1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) broadly defines "terrorist organization" to include, among
other specific categories, any "group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not," that engages in terrorist activity or provides material support
for terrorist activities.7
The interaction of these four provisions raises two primary issues for
refugees and asylum seekers. First, the broad, exceptionless definition of
"material support" excludes otherwise meritorious refugees and asylum
seekers who give de minimis support to a "terrorist organization" after being
threatened with torture or execution. Second, the expansive definition of
"terrorist organization" captures refugees and asylum seekers who have fought
to challenge dictatorial regimes in their home countries, sometimes with the
support of the U.S. government.
(V) to solicit any individual-
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this subsection;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II);
or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III) unless the
solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; or
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material
support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or
other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training-
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any
member of such an organization; or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(llI), or to any member of such
an organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization.
I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
7. I.N.A. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(B)(vi). A "terrorist organization" is
an organization
(I) designated under section 1189 of this title;
(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of
State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization engages in
the activities described in subclauses (1) through (VI) of clause (iv); or
(1ll) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages
in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the activities described in subclauses (1) through
(VI) of clause (iv).
[Vol. 59:935
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE MATERIAL-SUPPORT BAR
A. Legislative History
The material-support bar, as it stands today, was not enacted overnight
or even all at once. Its first iteration appeared in the
Immigration Act of 1990 when Congress added the words "terrorist activities"
to the list of reasons for which aliens may be denied admission 8 to or
8. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-75
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)) (including "[t]errorist activities" in the list of
grounds justifying the exclusion of a person from the United States). Section 6(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1990 added § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(i), which provided:
(B) TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.-
(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who-
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, or
(11) a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe, is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iii)), is
excludable. An alien who is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the
Palestine Liberation Organization is considered, for purposes of this Act, to be engaged in a
terrorist activity.
Id. § 106(a), 104 Stat. at 5069.
Section 6(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 also added 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(B)(ii), which read
(ii) TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED.-As used in this Act, the term "terrorist activity"
means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or
which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United
States or any State) and which involves any of the following:
(1) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or
vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain,
another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization)
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section
1 116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain),
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
Id. § 106(a), 104 Stat. at 5069-70.
Finally, section 6(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 added 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(3)(B)(iii),
which provided:
(iii) ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED.-As used in this Act, the term "engage
in terrorist activity" means to commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an
organization, an act of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or government in
conducting a terrorist activity at any time, including any of the following acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.
2010]
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deported9 from the United States.' 0 This 1990 amendment to the INA provides
the foundation upon which the present material-support bar provisions stand.
In 1996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), which was intended "to prevent persons within the United States, or
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support
or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities."'
'
Specifically, the AEDPA created a process by which the Secretary of State
could designate particular groups as foreign terrorist organizations.' 2 Under
the Immigration Act of 1990 and the AEDPA, the material-support bar was
much narrower than it is today because the definition of "terrorist
organization" was limited to those organizations designated by the Secretary of
State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189.3
In 2001, Congress dramatically enhanced the sweep of the material-support
bar by adopting a broader definition of "terrorist organization" in the USA
PATRIOT Act. 14  Specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the
definition of "terrorist organization" beyond the foreign terrorist organizations
designated by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189, to include any
"group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages
(II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons, explosives, or training,
to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit
an act of terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any
terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist organization,
terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
Id. § 601(a), 104 Stat. at 5070.
9. Id. § 602(a), 104 Stat. at 5077-81 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B)
(2006)) (including "[t]errorist activities" in the list of grounds justifying deportation from the
United States). Section 602(a) adopted the definition of "terrorist activities" provided in section
601 (a). Id.
10. The I.N.A. has always provided for the exclusion of aliens on security-related grounds.
See I.N.A. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (excluding from admission to the United States "[a]liens
who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the
United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial
to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States").
11. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247.
12. Id. § 302, 110 Stat. at 1248-50 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1189).
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (Supp. 11 1996); see also REFUGEE COUNCIL USA,
THE IMPACT OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR: U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2006 AND 2007 5 (2006), http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/RCUSA2006fin
postbl-w.pdf.
14. USA PATRIOT Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2000)
(lacking a definition of "terrorist organization"), with 8 U.S.C. § I1 82(a)(3)(B) (Supp. II 2002)
(including a definition of "terrorist organization").
[Vol. 59:935
Material Support: Immigration and National Security
in" certain overt terrorist activity.1 5  These terrorist organizations are
commonly known as "Tier III" organizations because the definition appears in
8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). The USA PATRIOT Act also expanded the
definition of "engag[ing] in terrorist activity" to include, among other things,
providing material support to Tier III organizations.'
6
The REAL ID Act of 2005 further expanded the definition of Tier III
organizations to include any "group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in" any
terrorist activity, including providing material support.' 7 In turn, the REAL ID
Act concomitantly broadened the material-support bar because any alien found
to have given material support to any such organization is both inadmissible
and deportable.
B. The Material-Support Bar Today
Together, these enactments have produced a statute that defines "material
support" for terrorism as the provision of
a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of
funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or
identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or
radiological weapons), explosives, or training ... for the commission
of a terrorist activity; ... to any individual who the actor knows, or
reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a
• • - 18
terrorist activity; [or] ... to a terrorist organization.
The statute defines "terrorist activity" as any activity that is illegal where it
is committed or would be illegal if it were committed in the United States, and
which involves (1) "hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance"; (2) "seizing or
detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another
individual" for ransom or to compel a third party to "do or abstain from doing
any act"; (3) "[a] violent attack upon an internationally protected person"; (4)
"[a]n assassination"; (5) the use of a weapon of mass destruction, including
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, or the use of a firearm or other
dangerous weapon with the intent to endanger others or damage property; or
(6) conspiracy to carry out any of the aforementioned terrorist activities. S A
"terrorist organization" is any organization "designated under [8 U.S.C. §]
1189" (Tier I); otherwise designated in the Federal Register (Tier II); or any
15. USA PATRIOT Act, § 41 I(a)(I)(G), 115 Stat. at 347-48.
16. USA PATRIOT ACT § 411(a)(1)(F), 115 Stat. at 346-47. Compare 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000), with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (Supp. II 2002).
17. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 103(c), 119 Stat. 231, 308
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006)).
18. 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
19. Id. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
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"group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages
in, or has a subgroup which engages in" the listed activities (Tier II1).20
The intricacies of the statutory scheme are important because the interaction
of these complex provisions has dramatically affected the United States'
refugee-resettlement program and asylum seekers, because refugees and
asylum seekers "can be excluded for admission to the United States for giving
any kind of support, no matter how insignificant, to virtually any group of two
or more people which has ever used armed force against anyone." However,
the statute does provide two limited statutory exceptions to the bar.
C. Statutory Exceptions
The first of two limited statutory exceptions that narrow the scope of the
material-support bar was enacted by Congress in the USA PATRIOT Act.
22
This provision limits the application of 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX), which
renders inadmissible a spouse or child of an alien excluded under the material-
support bar for actions that occurred within the last five years.23 Specifically,
the exception permits the admission of a spouse or child "who did not know or
should not reasonably have known" of the material support given by the
spouse or parent, or who "renounced" the material support that caused the
24
spouse or parent to be deemed inadmissible. Although this exception
certainly narrows the application of the material-support bar, it does not
address the core issues raised by its application to refugees and asylum
seekers.25
The second exception, which is similarly limited, truncates the general
definition of "terrorist activities" found in 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(i) by
providing that a member of a Tier III terrorist organization, who would
ordinarily be inadmissible, may be admitted to the United States if "the alien
can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization., 26 The implications of this exception on the material-support bar
are unclear because, on its face, the provision only applies to members of Tier
III organizations, not aliens who have given material support to such
organizations. 27 This provision-a narrow exception for members but not for
material supporters-highlights the curious breadth of the material-support bar,
particularly after the REAL ID Act's expansion of the definition of Tier III
20. Id. § 182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
21. REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supra note 13.
22. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411 (a)(1)(D), 115 Stat. 272, 346 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § II 82(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. i 2008)).
23. 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX).
24. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).
25. See infra Part 11I.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI).
27. See id.
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terrorist organizations. By enacting this exception, Congress implicitly
admitted that it might be impossible for a layperson to know that the United
States has labeled an organization as "terrorist." Many Tier III organizations
are not "terrorist organizations" in common parlance. Instead, some are
opposition political parties that fight for democratic reform in their home
countries; others are not "organizations" at all. Thus, the distinction begs the
question whether there should be a similar exception to the material-support
bar for material supporters, as well as whether the Tier III definition of
"terrorist organization" should be revisited.
In addition to these statutory exceptions, Congress empowered the
Secretaries of the Departments of State and Homeland Security the power to
exempt certain persons and organizations from the material-support bar.28 To
a certain degree, both Secretaries have successfully mitigated the negative
consequences of the material-support bar for deserving refugees and asylum
seekers by heavily exercising this exemption power over the last three years.
D. The Role of the Executive Branch
The difficult substantive policy issues underlying the material-support bar
and its application to refugees and asylum seekers have been made
exponentially more difficult to resolve because of the numerous government
actors involved. Until recently, the politically sensitive nature of the issue
caused a stalemate between Congress and the executive branch. On the one
hand, Congress lacked the political will to pass legislative amendments that
could ameliorate the negative impact of the material-support bar on individual
refugees and groups of refugees, as well as the United States' refugee
resettlement program as a whole. Instead, Congress insisted that the executive
branch exercise its statutory-waiver authority. On the other hand, the
executive branch-specifically, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security
and the Attorney General-was hesitant to exercise its authority to refrain from
applying the terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility to particular aliens
who, but for the material-support bar, would have been admissible. Instead,
the executive-branch actors emphasized the need for Congress to "fix" the
problem it created by amending the material-support statutory scheme so that
refugees or asylum seekers with otherwise meritorious claims-people whom
neither Congress nor the Secretaries of State or Homeland Security would
consider "terrorists" in the traditional sense of the word-would not be
rendered inadmissible or deportable.
Various executive-branch actors have both exacerbated the effects of the
material-support bar due to their rigid interpretation of the statutory provisions
and softened its application by carefully exercising their statutory-waiver
authority.
28. Id.
2010]
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1. Statutory Interpretation
The executive branch's effort to enforce the anti-terrorism immigration laws
strictly, which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has described as
"an essential weapon in the Administration's counter-terrorism arsenal, '29 has
drawn the ire of refugee and asylum-seeker advocates who describe its
interpretation as "extreme, inflexible, and inconsistent with this country's
commitments under the Refugee Convention and Protocol," and state that it
has "greatly exacerbated the impact of these terrorism-related provisions on
legitimate refugees who were never their intended targets."
30
Notwithstanding its recognition that "[b]ecause the material support bar
casts a broad net, its scope may include those who do not present a risk to U.S.
national security and to whom the United States is sympathetic and willing to
provide refuge, to the extent allowed by law," DHS has maintained its
expansive reading of the statute.31  Instead, it has focused its efforts on
exercising, and successfully urging Congress to expand, its authority to exempt
certain categories of otherwise inadmissible or deportable aliens, aimed at
refugees and asylum seekers, from the application of the material-support
29. The "Material-Support" Bar: Denying Refuge to the Persecuted?: Hearing Before the
S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Paul
Rosenzweig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Dep't of Homeland See.) [hereinafter
Statement of Paul Rosenzweig]. DHS has successfully used the material-support bar to deport
aliens, including:
an alien who was a former board member, fundraiser, and donor to the Benevolence
International Foundation (BIF), whose associates in the United States included Aafia Siddiqui
(placed on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Most Wanted Terrorists list after 9/11 for
assisting Al Qaeda), as well as members of the "Portland 7," a terrorist cell in Portland, Oregon,
which conspired to provide material support to Al Qaeda and the Taliban during the war against
the United States in Afghanistan.
Id.
30. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DENIAL AND DELAY 6 (2009). Human Rights First highlighted
the following statutory interpretations as particularly troublesome:
Treating victims of armed groups as supporters of the very groups that extorted goods or
services from them under threat of violence;
Applying the "terrorism bars" to the acts of children in the same way as to adults, and as a
result, barring a number of former child soldiers and child captives of armed groups;
Treating minimal contributions-a few dollars, a chicken, a bag of rice-as "material
support;"
Interpreting "material support" to cover virtually anything, including non-violent speech and
other purely political activity--e.g. writing for a student newspaper or distributing political
flyers-that a person did in connection with his or her membership in a group the Department of
Homeland Security deems to be a "terrorist organization" under the immigration laws, including a
"Tier III" group;
Treating medical care as "material support;" and
Retroactive application of the USA PATRIOT Act's definition of a "Tier III" organization to
groups that no longer exist or that have given up violence, stretching back as far as four decades.
Id
31. Statement of Paul Rosenzweig, supra note 29.
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bar.32 From DHS's perspective, this approach is the best of both worlds: DHS
can maintain extremely broad authority to deny admission or deport any alien
subject to the expansive material-support bar, but it can also curb the
"unintended consequences of the material support bar through the secretarial
exercises of discretionary authority to exempt deserving aliens." 33 Although
the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security (the two cabinet officials who
alone have the power to exempt certain aliens from the application of the
material-support bar) were slow to issue the first exemptions-both because of
the sluggish bureaucracy that defines administrative agencies and because of
their prudent decision to proceed with caution-they have now issued nine
categorical exemptions, which have allowed roughly 11,500 deserving
refugees to enter the country.
2. Exemption/Waiver Authority
Congress first gave the executive branch, specifically the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, in consultation with each other, the power to exempt
particular aliens from the material-support bar when they conclude in their
"sole and unreviewable discretion" that the bar should not apply.34 However,
neither the Secretary of State nor the Attorney General exercised this
exemption authority.
35
This authority was replaced by an exemption provision contained in the
REAL ID Act of 2005. The REAL ID Act exemption provision gave the
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, after consultation with each other
and the Attorney General, the authority to exempt certain aliens from the
application of four aspects of the material-support bar.37 First, the Secretaries
could exempt representatives of "a political, social, or other group that
endorses or espouses terrorist activity." 8 Second, they could exempt members
of Tier III organizations. 39 Third, the Secretaries could exempt aliens who
gave material support to an organization or individual that has engaged in a
"terrorist activity." 40  Fourth, they could exempt members of Tier III
organizations labeled as such because they contain subgroups that engage in
32. See id.; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 30, at 43; see also Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. J, § 691, 121 Stat. 1844, 2364-66 (2007).
33. See Statement of Paul Rosenzweig, supra note 29.
34. See 8 U.S.C. § I I82(a)(3)(B)(iv) (Supp. II 2002).
35. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 30, at 41.
36. Id.
37. REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (granting "[t]he Secretary of
State, after consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the
Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, . . . sole unreviewable discretion" to exempt aliens from application of the material-
support bar).
38. L.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(IV)(bb), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(lV)(bb).
39. I.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i)(VII), 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII).
40. I.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(Vl), 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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"terrorist activity. 4 1 However, this exemption did not allow the Secretaries to
waive the application of the material-support bar with respect to a Tier II
organization that itself engaged in "terrorist activity.
' 42
After the 2007 amendment, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security
gained authority to exempt aliens from all but six provisions of the material-
support bar: (1) "aliens for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe are
engaged in (present activities) or likely to engage in (future activities) terrorist
activity"; 43 (2) "members of Tier I and Tier II terrorist organizations" ;44 (3)
"representatives of Tier I and Tier II terrorist organizations"; 45 (4) "aliens who
voluntarily and knowingly engaged in terrorist activity on behalf of a Tier I or
Tier II organization";46 (5) "aliens who voluntarily and knowingly endorsed or
espoused terrorist activity or persuaded others to do so on behalf of a Tier I or
Tier II organization"; 47 and (6) "aliens who voluntarily and knowingl received
military-type training from a Tier I or Tier II terrorist organization.'
'4 8
III. REFUGEE AND ASYLUM-SEEKER PROBLEM
When Congress significantly broadened the material-support bar via the
USA PATRIOT Act following the September l1th terrorist attacks, it
immediately, though not single-handedly, decimated the United States'
refugee-resettlement program.49  Although the United States admitted 73,147
refugees in 2000 and 69,304 refugees in 2001, it admitted only 27,110 in 2002,
41. I.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(lII), 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(1Il).
42. See Oversight of US. Refugee Admissions and Policy: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary of State, Population, Refugees, and Migration) (noting that
"Cuban anti-Castro freedom fighters and Vietnamese Montagnards who fought alongside U.S.
forces have been found inadmissible on this basis, as have Karen who participated in resistance to
brutal attacks on their families and friends by the Burmese regime").
43. Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Acting Deputy Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., to Assoc. Dirs., Chief Admin. Appeals, and Chief Counsel, U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs. 2 (July 28, 2008) [hereinafter Aytes Memo]; see also 8 U.S.C. §
II 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(Il).
44. Aytes Memo, supra note 43; see also 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V).
45. Aytes Memo, supra note 43; see also 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(aa).
46. Aytes Memo, supra note 43; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(l), (a)(3)(B)(iv).
47. Aytes Memo, supra note 43; see also 8 U.S.C. § II 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII).
48. Aytes Memo, supra note 43; see also 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII).
49. See REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supra note 13, app. 7; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE &
BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. ISP-1-06-40 REPORT OF
INSPECTION: BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION 3 (2006) (noting that the
number of refugee admissions "plummeted" by roughly two-thirds in 2002 in part "because of
more rigorous screening requirements for all categories of immigrants seeking entry to the United
States"); Susan Benesch & Devon Chaffee, The Ever-Expanding Material Support Bar: An
Unjust Obstacle for Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 465, 466 (2006)
("The material support problem has nearly shut down the U.S. refugee admissions program for
Colombia and Burma ....").
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which was the first full year for which data about refugee admissions under the
expanded material-support bar was available. 50  Since 2002, the number of
refugee admissions has risen steadily each year but has yet to return to pre-
September 11 th and pre-USA PATRIOT Act levels.5 I In 2007, the United
States admitted 48,281 refugees, and in 2008, the number rose to 60,192, a
marked increase compared to recent years.
53
But the numbers do not do justice to the human cost of the material-support
bar: the bar prevents refugees and asylum seekers with meritorious claims from
entering, or remaining, in the United States. Moreover, it prevents members of
both groups from obtaining green cards by barring them from changing their
status to Lawful Permanent Resident. Accordingly, refugee advocates, the
executive branch, and Congress have worked to mitigate the negative
consequences of the bar. Thus far, they have made progress in reconciling the
United States' legitimate national-security interests with its commitment to
providing a refuge for the persecuted.
IV. NATIONAL-SECURITY CONCERNS
Despite the problems that have arisen under the bar, the material-support
statute has proven to be an extraordinarily effective tool for federal prosecutors
to eliminate support networks used to fund terrorist organizations. Any alien
who provides material support to an individual or organization that engages in
or supports terrorist activity is inadmissible or ineligible to receive almost all
immigration benefits. 54  Although this principle has proven controversial,
many have argued that it is vital to implementing the U.S. government's
overall counterterrorism strategy55 and is essential to providing the United
States with the means to employ counterterrorism measures. 56 It is clear that
terrorists and terrorist organizations require funds and support to operate and
.... 57
levy successful attacks both within and outside the United States. Congress
and the United States courts have reaffirmed this notion: "foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
50. See REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supra note 13, app. 7. Not only was the total number of
refugees admitted in 2002 one-third the number admitted in 2000 and 2001, but it fell nearly
43,000 admissions short of the President's goal of 70,000 admissions. See James W. Ziglar,
Immigration & Naturalization Servs. Comm'r, Address at the National Immigration Forum
Conference (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016%7c
6715%7c I 2053%7c26279%7c I 2228%7c2059.
51. See REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, supra note 13, app. 7.
52, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
53. BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES & MIGRATION OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FISCAL YEAR 2008.
54. I.N.A. § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
55. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000).
56. Id.; see AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247.
57. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136; see AEDPA § 301(a), 110 Stat. at 1247.
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conduct."58 Although refugee concerns are important, they must be weighed
against the risk of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and the effectiveness of
the material-support bar in thwarting such attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, the material-support bar has proven to be a controversial
body of law. The broad, exceptionless definition of "material support" bars
otherwise meritorious refugees and asylum seekers who provide de minimis
support to a "terrorist organization" after being threatened with torture or
execution. Moreover, the broad definition of "terrorist organization" captures
refugees and asylum seekers who have challenged dictatorial regimes in their
home countries, sometimes even with the support of the U.S. government.
Despite its shortfalls, the bar still serves as a necessary counterterrorism tool
for the United States to protect its citizens, even if that protection comes at the
expense of prohibiting refugees from seeking asylum in the United States.
58. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136 (quoting AEDPA § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 1247).
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